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From regional security developments to the last stage of military modernization, much has happened over the last year for Philippine defense. Tensions in the West Philippine Sea (WPS), <a style="color: #3598db;" href="https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/04/15/23/china-criticized-for-veiled-threat-vs-ofws-in-taiwan">a thinly veiled threat to Overseas Filipino Workers in Taiwan from the Chinese Ambassador</a>, <a style="color: #3598db;" href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3349257/philippines-us-announce-locations-of-four-new-edca-sites/">four new Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) Sites with the US</a>, <a style="color: #3598db;" href="https://www.rappler.com/plus-membership-program/record-firsts-manila-tokyo-security-defense-ties/">talks of new security treaties with Japan</a>, <a style="color: #3598db;" href="https://globalnation.inquirer.net/201506/%E2%82%B15b-released-for-missile-system-combat-choppers">the procurement of Indian anti-ship missiles</a>, the list goes on. Among these recent developments, the most tangible have been seen in military exercises on Philippine soil.
Manila is no stranger to hosting foreign troops for drills. From the Cold War, when some of the United States&rsquo; largest military installations were at Subic and Clark, to the Global War on Terror where a vast host of countries have come to the Philippines to train. Activities during these exercises reflected the security issues at the time. One exercise that reflects this trend is the Balikatan series of drills. Translating to &ldquo;Shoulder-to-shoulder,&rdquo; the exercises officially began in 1985 and have become the premier military exercise between Manila and Washington, with occasional participation from other partners.
In recent years, the number of participants and the complexity of activities at Balikatan have been viewed as one of the indicators of US-Philippine defense relations. The 2015 and 2019 drills saw a noticeable upscaling in both activities and personnel, likely due to regional events that occurred prior to the exercises. COVID-19 effectively halted major military exercises with Manila&rsquo;s security partners for almost two years, <a style="color: #3598db;" href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-philippines-usa/u-s-cancels-military-drills-with-philippines-over-coronavirus-idUSKBN21E0DF">with Balikatan2020 canceled</a> and <a style="color: #3598db;" href="https://www.rappler.com/nation/philippines-united-states-resume-balikatan-exercises-2021/">2021&rsquo;s iteration heavily reduced</a>. When Balikatan returned in 2022, it came back larger and alongside other exercises.
2022: Setting the Stage
Balikatan 2022 marked a significant shift toward territorial defense operations (TDO), marking the first deployment of the advanced US Patriot surface-to-air missile system and brand-new 3d Marine Littoral Regiment to the Philippines. Both American and Philippine forces tested out new equipment and tactics focused on coastal defense during the exercise. While the 37th edition of Balikatan saw an uptick in troops and new activities, it was not unprecedented.
Preceding Balikatan 2022 by a month, the smaller US-Philippine army-focused Salaknib exercise kicked off. Translating to &ldquo;Shield,&rdquo; Salaknib began in 2016 with a distinct focus on ground operations, contrasting the broader scope of Balikatan. Traditionally, this engagement was seen as a relatively small exchange, especially compared to the larger Balikatan drills. Yet, Salaknib 2022 was the largest to date and in<a style="color: #3598db;" href="https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1198763">volved new activities such as a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) live fire.</a>
Throughout 2022, this pattern continued. Three significant exercises include: (1) the <a style="color: #3598db;" href="https://globalnation.inquirer.net/207752/us-deploys-top-gear-in-kamandag-drills">Marine Corps: Kaagapay Ng Mga Mandirigma Ng Dagat 6</a>, held on October 3-14 with Philippine, American, Korean, and Japanese troops focusing on marine drills, with particular attention given to Human Assistance/Disaster Response (HA/DR) and coastal defense; (2) the Navy: Sama Sama-Lumbas 2022 on October 11-18 that combined the previously bilateral US (Sama-Sama) and Australian (Lumbas) into one multilateral exercise. Participants included the Philippines, the US, Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, and France; lastly, the Air Force Pareho 2022 held on December 6-7 which marked the first time that Japan Air Self-Defense Force F-15Js entered Clark Air Base since the Second World War and enabled Japanese pilots to exchange practices with their Philippine counterparts.
Whether from the decrease of COVID-19 restrictions to the US-Philippine rapprochement or the new Marcos Administration&rsquo;s foreign policy, 2022 was an indication of where Philippine security cooperation was headed in 2023. Many of these engagements contrasted the disengagement seen in previous years, with the return of higher-end drills and more troops. However, these events would quickly be overshadowed by the following year.
2023: Opening the Floodgates 
<a style="color: #3598db;" href="https://ph.usembassy.gov/philippine-u-s-troops-to-hold-largest-ever-balikatan-exercise-from-april-11-to-28/">Balikatan 2023 was the largest to date, involving over 17,000 troops</a>. Philippine, American, and Australian troops trained from Palawan to Batanes in some of the most intensive drills to date. Highlights of the exercise included the first sinking exercise (SINKEX), patriot missile launch, and aerial assaults across Batanes in the Luzon Strait. Observers from Japan, India, the United Kingdom, Singapore, and Indonesia were also present.
Both Philippine and American officials highlighted the message of deterrence that the drills were demonstrating. <a style="color: #3598db;" href="https://apnews.com/article/politics-physical-fitness-philippines-china-fb9f434faea84d8f96a37717f1bb4a16">A month before the start of the drills, U.S. Army Major General Joseph Ryan highlighted the messaging that the almost 500 scheduled U.S.-Philippine military exercises have.</a> While AFP press releases do not specify who the exercises are aimed against, American officers are blunter, with Ryan stating &ldquo;Does the backdrop of PRC aggression enter our minds when we train? Absolutely.&rdquo;
Many notable exercises have taken place this year, including but not limited to:
<img src="https://cdn.factsasia.org/Screenshot_2023_09_06_at_12_34_05_PM_08d337d278.png" alt="" width="988" height="752" />
With rising tensions in the region, particularly WPS issues with China, and fears of how a conflict in the Taiwan Strait would impact the Philippines, Manila is seeking closer and deeper security relationships with its partners. From 2022&rsquo;s exercise track record, more prominent and intensive exercises are one of Manila&rsquo;s favorite displays of increased defense cooperation, especially with old and new partners.
<a style="color: #3598db;" href="https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/news/2023-08-14/philippine-and-australian-forces-embark">On August 14, HMAS Canberra set off from Australia with around 100 Filipino troops onboard</a>. <a style="color: #3598db;" href="https://globalnation.inquirer.net/218270/bongbong-marcos-watches-ph-australia-amphibian-drills-in-zambales">Exercise Alon, the first-ever Australian-Philippine bilateral amphibious exercise, saw amphibious and aerial assaults take place around the Philippines.</a>&nbsp; Compared to other exercises, this is also the first large-scale exercise that is not led by the United States. Alon itself is under the Australian Defence Force&rsquo;s Indo-Pacific Endeavour 2023, which is one of Canberra&rsquo;s efforts to engage its partners across the region. Coincidentally, the Australian flagship departed for the Philippines a few days after an incident between Chinese and Philippine vessels in the WPS.
However, for Manila to engage other partners it must complete several treaties to allow for deeper and more complex exercises. At the moment, only the US and Australia have Visiting Forces Agreements (VFA) with the Philippines. Without one, partners are limited in what they can bring to train with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) as well as the activities during an exercise. Other partners that the Philippines is engaging with, such as India, Korea, and Japan, have no similar agreements with Manila. For now, these partners have been engaging in exercises with military observers and small contingents.
<a style="color: #3598db;" href="https://www.ph.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_en/11_000001_01206.html">Japan is eyed as the next major official Philippine security partner, with both countries reportedly looking at a VFA and/or Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA)</a>. The Japan Self-Defense Forces have been looking to increase engagement with the Philippines, particularly in the maritime and aerial domains. Until these agreements are completed, Japan is restrained from engaging in larger and more complex exercises. Tokyo seeks to unshackle itself, both in exercises and equipment, in order to deepen security ties with the Philippines.
Considering the number of exercises conducted, have these been successful in displaying deterrence and aiding Manila&rsquo;s military modernization? For deterrence, while Chinese sentiments have been aimed at the new EDCA, it would be hard for Beijing to ignore the number of exercises in Northern Luzon. Especially with their geographic relation to Taiwan. To make matters worse for Chinese planners, Balikatan 2023 saw the most intensive activities to date near Taiwan. Batanes, which is only 400 kilometers from Taiwan and resides on the crucial chokepoint of the Luzon Strait have been the grounds for aerial assaults and deployment of advanced missile systems.
Some critics may point out that these drills and new EDCA sites paint the Philippines as a target because it puts the country in the crosshairs of China. Yet, the <a style="color: #3598db;" href="https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2023/04/19/2260092/manalo-philippines-wont-let-us-store-weapons-taiwan-ops-edca-sites">Philippine government has reiterated that the EDCA sites will not be used for US military purposes during a Taiwan conflict</a>. Manila has also shown some restraint on the exercises, with anti-aircraft live-fire drills in Ilocos Norte being moved to Zambales. At the end of the day, <a style="color: #3598db;" href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/08/more-purpose-fewer-platitudes-the-philippines-defense-diplomacy-under-marcos/">regardless of where or what the exercise is, it is within Manila&rsquo;s right to carry it out.</a>
It should also be noted that even before the major exercises, the Philippines had been stepping up the defense of Luzon due to regional tensions. A nightmare scenario for Manila in a Taiwan conflict could be the seizure of Batanes and segments of Northern Luzon by Chinese forces because of its crucial geography. Last year&rsquo;s exercises saw an increased focus on coastal defense. Philippine force design and distribution also reflect a new focus on the north.
For example, the Balikatan drills in Batanes were focused on defending and retaking the islands. The Philippine Marine Corps&rsquo; 4th Brigade has declared that their posting in Ilocos Norte is <a style="color: #3598db;" href="https://pia.gov.ph/news/2022/11/22/4th-marine-brigade-redeployed-in-ilocos-norte-some-parts-of-northern-luzon">&ldquo;permanent&rdquo;</a> after redeploying from Sulu last year. <a style="color: #3598db;" href="https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1781455/afp-to-set-up-new-coastal-defense-post-in-cagayan">Philippine Marines are also setting up a coastal defense site, most likely for the force&rsquo;s incoming BrahMos anti-ship missiles,</a>&nbsp; on Calayan, an island in the Luzon Strait. This deployment of forces and exercises to the region provides a strong deterrent to prevent the nightmare scenario of a Chinese seizure of the region.
As for military modernization, the exercises have brought tremendous insight to the AFP. The training and experience received during these drills aid Philippine military modernization via opportunities to familiarize its troops with modern technologies and learn tactics, training, and procedures from advanced militaries. This could be seen with the Philippine Army Artillery Regiment, which <a style="color: #3598db;" href="https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/07/philippines-to-acquire-himars-more-brahmos-missiles/">recently announced its intentions to procure High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems for its rocket artillery batteries</a>. Earlier in the year, the regiment directly partook in the reloading and operation of American HIMARS during both phases of Salaknib 2023. Salaknibalso saw the two countries explicitly focus on TDO, which involves higher-end training than in previous exercises. Philippine units, such as the Army Artillery and Coastal Defense Regiments, receive knowledge from developed and more advanced US counterparts. As many of the procurements and theories of these units are firsts for the AFP, American input is invaluable in guiding their development. Similar activities focusing on territorial defense were seen during Balikatan, MASA, and Cope Thunder.
From force design to weapon procurements, these exchanges provide valuable aid for Manila&rsquo;s modernization program. The exercises will likely influence the last phase of Horizon 3 beginning this year and the upcoming five-year US-Philippine Sector Security Assistance Roadmap.
Conclusion
For the Philippines, exercises are a tool to both demonstrate the strength of its partnerships and aid its military modernization efforts. However, exercises and allies alone are not, nor should be, the sole answer for addressing Manila&rsquo;s various security issues. Partners can only do so much, especially when adversaries are targeting Philippine interests below the threshold of conflict.
This is seen most prominently in Chinese gray zone operations, which allows China to degrade Philippine territorial integrity without invoking US defense commitments. Washington may help the Philippines develop its forces and become interoperable, but it will not directly engage adversaries unless they fire the first shot. Many of the exercises this year, while large and complex, are designed around conventional operations. Of course, this is good for Manila&rsquo;s efforts to modernize its military and orient toward higher-end TDO. Yet it is not going to deter China Coast Guard vessels from shooting water cannons at Philippine vessels or Maritime Militia boats going to Scarborough Shoal.&nbsp;
While this is changing, with the modernization of the US-Philippine alliance and plans for a joint patrol before the end of the year. Exercises are also shifting to address these issues, as seen with the <a style="color: #3598db;" href="https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/871756/philippines-japan-us-coast-guards-start-first-ever-kaagapay-exercise/story/">first trilateral Philippines-US-Japan Coast Guard exercise</a>&nbsp;earlier this year. The messaging at Kaagapay 2023 was not explicit, but the timing of the drills and grouping of participants sent a strong message clearly aimed at lower-end threats. For the gray hulls of the Philippine Navy and its partners, similar drills should be held, preferably separate from the larger regional exercises like Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) to send a targeted message that Manila&rsquo;s partners are focusing on enhancing the Philippines&rsquo; capabilities. Coordinated patrols, <a style="color: #3598db;" href="https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1238045/us-philippine-navies-complete-coordinated-patrol-in-southern-sulu-sea/">which are not unprecedented</a>, provide an enticing option for the Philippines to do presence missions alongside its partners.
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Aaron-Matthew is a freelance writer based in Washington, D.C covering security developments in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in regards to the Philippines. He is currently studying International Relations at American University.

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